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How Real Are Future Events?
John Perry, Stanford
1. Fatalism
My main aim in this talk is to discuss McTaggart’s argument for the unreal-
ity of time. I will ﬁ nd a ﬂ aw in his argument, but ﬁ nding the ﬂ aw will lead 
us to the conclusion that although time is real, future events are not. I will 
begin, however, not with McTaggart, but with a version of an ancient argu-
ment for fatalism. By fatalism I do not mean the doctrine that we are fated, 
like Oedipus, to do something terrible at some point in the future, no mat-
ter what choices we make now, and no matter what happens in between. I 
mean the philosophical doctrine that we can do nothing at all to eﬀ ect the 
future in any way. For most of us this will mean we are not only fated, in the 
ﬁ rst sense, to do terrible things, although perhaps not as terrible as Oedi-
pus was fated to do, but that that even the route to these terrible deeds is 
not in our power to alter. I adopt as a working principle that we are entitled 
to the distinctions we need to avoid fatalism. I will see what these are, and 
then maintain that they show us the way to avoid McTaggart’s argument, 
and that, in doing that, we will see that although there is no reason to agree 
with McTaggart that time is unreal, the future is, in fairly clear sense, not
real.
Th e fatalistic argument goes like this:
1.  Th e proposition that Hillary Clinton will be inaugurated President in 
2009 is either true or false, and not both.
2.  If Hillary Clinton will be inaugurated President in 2009, then that 
proposition is true.
3.  Propositions do not change their truth-values.
4.  So, if the proposition that Hillary Clinton will be inaugurated Presi-
dent in 2009 is true today, then it was true a year ago.
5.  You cannot change the past.
6.  So, if something was true a year ago, no one can do anything now, or at 
any time later than now, that will aﬀ ect its truth-value.
7.  So, if Hillary Clinton will be inaugurated President in 2009, there is 
nothing that she can do or Bill Clinton can do or Jeb Bush can do to-
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day, or anything that anyone else can do today, or any day in the future, 
to prevent it.
8.  As important as Hillary Clinton is, and as important as the issue of her 
inauguration is, there is nothing in principle that makes this event spe-
cial in terms of this argument.
9.  So, if something is going to happen in the future, there is nothing any-
one can do now or at any time later than now to prevent it.
Th e main problem with this argument, it seems to me, is that it does not 
recognize that many propositions, certainly including propositions about 
who wins elections and who is then inaugurated as president the following 
January, are made true or false by events, in this case, crucially, the elections 
that are held in November preceding the inauguration, and the events be-
tween then and the next January 20th, which may include Supreme Court 
decisions and the like. If it turns out that Hillary Clinton wins the 2008 
U.S. presidential election and is then inaugurated in January 2009, this will 
be on account of events many of which will not happen until Election Day, 
the ﬁ rst Tuesday in November, 2008.
Suppose that Hillary and Bill Clinton have a big ﬁ ght in late Septem-
ber 2008. It would be pleasant to provide details concerning what this ﬁ ght 
might be about, but I will leave that to the audience’s imagination. Feel-
ing hurt and unappreciated, it occurs to Bill that he could make a speech 
in which he details every nasty thing Hillary has ever done and said, and 
asserts that he wouldn’t vote for her for dogcatcher, much less for Presi-
dent, and that by doing so, he could prevent her election. He can prevent 
her from being inaugurated. Remembering all the good times he had in the 
White House, he doesn’t do it, and she is elected and inaugurated. Still, if 
he had done it, he would have been aﬀ ecting the future, not the past. He 
wouldn’t have changed the past at all. He will not have changed the past, for 
he will not do anything that makes false something that has already been 
made true, nor does he do anything that makes true something that has al-
ready been made false.
We need to think about the truth of propositions in some way that at 
least does not rule out this common sense response to the fatalist argument. 
Even if we are hard determinists, that is, even if we believe that determinism 
is true and it rules out freedom, we should not be convinced by fatalism, for 
if fatalism is true, determinism is really quite beside the point.
It seems to me that to allow this common sense response, we need to rec-
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ognize two concepts of truth in relation to propositions. Th e ﬁ rst is a prop-
erty of propositions: a proposition be true or be false, or, if you prefer, be true 
or false of a world. It’s best to avoid tense in using this concept, hence the 
untensed “be”. Second, events up to a certain time make a proposition true, 
or make it false, or leave it’s truth or falsity open. 
Th ere is an important connection between these concepts:
If events up to a certain time make a proposition true (or false), then it be true 
(or be false).
Th e converse principle does not hold. Th ere are, or at least seem to be, 
propositions that are not made true by events, such as the propositions of 
logic and mathematics and other necessary truths. If we believe that the 
laws of nature are contingent, and also believe that they are not merely the 
empirical generalizations that remain true at the end of time, but somehow 
structural principles that shape what happens, then they too will not be 
made true by events; events will conform to them, but not make them true.
From the connection, that propositions made true, be true, and what we 
know about being true, we know that if events up to a certain time make 
a proposition true (or false), events up to some other time, earlier or later, 
don’t make it false (or true). From this, I believe, we arrive at the correct un-
derstanding of the claim that you can’t change the past:
You can’t do anything to make a proposition false that has already been made 
true, or to make a proposition true that has already been made false.
However, the following principle is not correct: 
If proposition P be true, no one can do anything now that will aﬀ ect its truth-
value.
Th is is not correct, because the events that will make P true may lie in the 
future, and someone powerful, like Bill Clinton, may well be able to do 
something to prevent them.
Stated carefully, the ﬁ rst steps of the fatalistic argument become:
Th e proposition that Hillary Clinton is inaugurated President in 2009 be 
true, or be false, but not both.
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If Hillary Clinton will be inaugurated President in 2009, then that propo-
sition be true.
But from this, nothing too signiﬁ cant follows. From the supposition that 
the proposition be true, it does not follow that it has been made true by to-
day, or yesterday, or will have been made true by, say, late September 2008. 
So it doesn’t follow that, if Bill Clinton were to prevent it from being made 
true, by a nasty speech in late September 2008, he would have in any sense 
changed the past.
For discussions of determinism, a third concept is important. If a prop-
osition is entailed by propositions that have been made true by what has 
happened by a certain time, together with the laws of nature, and the laws 
of nature are propositions that be true without having to be made true by 
events, then I will say that the proposition is settled by the time in ques-
tion, although it has not yet been made true. So, if determinism is true, it 
may be settled by late September 2008, and indeed may have been settled by 
the time that Adam bit into the apple, that Hillary Clinton would be inau-
gurated as President in 2009. Th e question of the compatibility of human 
freedom and determinism is whether we can, at a given time, do things to 
prevent events whose occurrence is already settled. But that issue, I leave 
aside; I mention it only to emphasize that being settled, in this sense, is one 
thing, being made true is another.
Let’s consider a manageable series of events, say the presidential inaugu-
rations in the United States of the 20th century, from McKinley’s in 1901 
to George Bush’s in 2001.1
Consider the domain of all the people who appeared on the ballot for 
U.S. president in the 20th century. Consider the property, being inaugurated 
as President of the U.S in D, where D is a year. Th is domain and property 
give us a set of atomic propositions. Some of these, like
Th at Carter be inaugurated President in 1976
be true of the sequence, and others, like
1 Th rough 1933 inaugurations were held on March 4; since then they have been held 
on January 20. Vice-Presidents Th eodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry Tru-
man, Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford all became president without being in-
augurated, through the death or resignation of a president. Roosevelt, Coolidge, 
Truman and Johnson were subsequently elected to full terms and inaugurated.
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Th at Carter be inaugurated President in 1980
be false of the sequence.
Each atomic proposition was made true, or was made false, by the events 
that occurred in the twentieth century up through March 4 of the year that 
is a constituent of the proposition. So, as of, say, April of 1975, a number of 
propositions that be true of the sequence were not yet made true or made 
false. As of April 1975, it had not been made true that Bush was inaugurat-
ed in 2001, nor had it been made false that Gore was inaugurated in 2001.
2. Chronological possibility
Now I’d like to introduce a second class of propositions, of the form:
X in D can prevent P
where X is a candidate from our domain, D is a year in the twentieth cen-
tury, and P is one of the original atomic propositions. Examples are:
Carter in 1980 can prevent that Reagan be inaugurated 1981
Th is would seem to be true if in 1980 there was some set of basic bod-
ily movements that Carter could have made (or refrained from making), 
which, had he made them (or refrained from making them), other circum-
stances being what they were, this would have led to his winning the elec-
tion of November 1980, rather than Reagan. Many analysts think that had 
Carter been less obsessed about the hostage situation in Iran, and not tried 
to micromanage the issue, he would have defeated Reagan. If they are cor-
rect, this proposition is true. It is almost certainly true
Th at Reagan in 1980 can prevent that Reagan be inaugurated 1981.
Reagan could have withdrawn from the race. Or, just to put some more in-
triguing possibility before us, he could have taken oﬀ  all of his clothes in 
the middle of a speech, proclaimed that he was at a nudist, and would never 
wear another stitch, even if elected President. Or he could have divorced his 
wife Nancy, and married a young Hollywood starlet. I could go on, but per-
haps that suﬃ  ces for me to make the point.
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At each time there are propositions that have been made true, and propo-
sitions that have been made false, and, in addition, many propositions that 
have not been made true or made false. Th ere is a certain kind of impos-
sibility involved with respect to propositions that have already been made 
true (or false) by a certain time. Th ere is nothing anyone can do, and for 
that matter, nothing that can happen, whether done by a person or simply 
the result of non-human causes, that will make those propositions false (or 
true). Th e kind of possibility involved is not the same as logical possibility; 
that is, the falsity (or truth) of these propositions does not involve a con-
tradiction. Nor is it a matter of pure metaphysical impossibility; the propo-
sitions involved are not guaranteed to be true by whatever deep structural 
facts there are about the properties, relations and objects involved.
I’ll call this sort of impossibility and possibility, the sort of possibility and 
impossibility appealed to, but misused, in the fatalist argument, chronologi-
cal. Propositions that, at a given time, might still be made true by events are 
chronologically possible at that time, those that can no longer be made true 
are chronologically impossible at that time.2
3. McTaggart’s B-series and C-series
Th at said, I turn to John Ellis McTaggart and his famous argument, of al-
most one hundred years ago, that time is unreal. He describes three series 
of events, which he calls the C-series, the B-series and the A-series. We’ll 
put the A-series aside for the moment, and discuss the C-series and the B-
series. Th e C-series and the B-series both comprise all the events in history 
in order. Th ey diﬀ er in that the B-series also includes the temporal direction 
of the events.
Suppose that in the course of archival investigations you came across a list 
of leaders of some small country of which you had never heard, the Land of 
Woe. It looks like this: 
Year 100: the reign of Elwood the Unready begins
Year 110: the reign of Gretchen the Inept begins
Year 120: the reign of Ephraim the Ignorant begins
2 J. Ellis McTaggart, “Th e Unreality of Time”, Mind, N.S. 68, October 1908,
pp. 457–474.
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You don’t know whether the years listed are B.C. or A.D., however. Th us 
you don’t know whether Elwood came before or after Gretchen. You know 
that Elwood’s reign was next to Gretchen’s, and not next to Ephraim’s, but 
you don’t know which came ﬁ rst. You have order, but no direction. Basically, 
if you can say which events came between which events, you know the or-
der; if you can say which came ﬁ rst, you know the direction.
McTaggart believed that both order and direction are part of our concept 
of time, and that the direction of time is the direction of change. So the C-
series, plus the direction of change, should give us the B-series. McTaggart 
can come up with no coherent account of the direction of change, so he 
concluded that time is unreal.
 Let us take a miniature B-series, a partial list of the history of the world, 
to have something manageable to think about. Let us limit ourselves again 
to events that are inaugurations of United States Presidents. Th is is, I re-
alize, in many ways an extremely unpleasant subject to continue to think 
about, but I will plunge ahead nevertheless. I considered using the inaugu-
rations of governors of California as an example for this talk; that would 
have provided a pleasant bond between Austria and California, since Cali-
fornia’s present governor is the beloved Austrian Arnold Schwarzenegger. 
However, there is a great deal of jealousy among Americans from other 
states, some of whom are at the conference, because California has a Euro-
pean governor and no other state does. So I decided it was best to stick to 
the example of presidents.
Since you are required to be 35 years old to be inaugurated as Presi-
dent, we can be sure that all of the presidents inaugurated up until 2037 
are already alive. So let us limit ourselves to the succession of inaugurations 
that begins with Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s second inauguration in 1937, 
continues through George W. Bush’s second inauguration last January, and 
then continues with Hillary Clinton’s two inaugurations in 2009 and 2013, 
Laura Bush’s two inaugurations in 2017 and 2021, Chelsea Clinton’s two 
inaugurations in 2025 and 2029, Jenna Bush’s inauguration in 2033 and 
her twin sister Barbara’s in 2037. I’m not entirely certain of these results, of 
course, but that’s my best guess, and I am fairly conﬁ dent. So: 100 years of 
inaugural events and 100 propositions we’ll take to be of the form: 
Th at X be inaugurated succeeding Y
starting with
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Th at FDR be inaugurated succeeding himself
and continuing to
Th at Barbara Bush be inaugurated succeeding Jenna Bush. 
Let’s give this series of propositions another name, say, “Dismal”. If we 
think of Dismal as an ordered sequence of propositions then of course it 
cannot be changed; it is a set theoretical object, deﬁ ned by its members. 
If all of the propositions in Dismal are true, then Dismal is a sequence of 
propositions that corresponds to a part of the B-series of events. I’ll call 
such a series a “B-P series”. Now, even if Dismal be a B-P series, and even 
if we are all powerless to do change the membership of Dismal, still some-
one can do something that will make it not a B-P series, by doing some-
thing that will prevent one of the propositions in it from being made true, 
so that the event, to which this proposition would have corresponded, does 
not occur. For example, Jenna and Barbara Bush might become nuns, in 
which case they will be prevented by Papal decree from taking part in elec-
toral politics. Th at is not likely, but it could happen. Even if Dismal be a B-
P series, which requires that all the propositions in it be true, some of the 
events necessary to make it a B-P series have not yet happened. We, or at 
least powerful politicians, and their children, can do things that eﬀ ect which 
propositions having to do with future elections; all we cannot do is aﬀ ect 
the truth-values of the propositions that have already been made true or
false.
Still, we will assume that Dismal is a B-P series and plunge on.
4. The A-series and the D-series
Th e ﬁ rst thing we need to do is to pull out of Dismal the information about 
the direction of time. Th is gives us a C-P series, so I will call it DismalC. 
Th is is a series of propositions of the form
X be inaugurated next to Y.
Th is series contains information about which inaugurations were between 
which other inaugurations, but not about which came earlier and later. Now, 
how do we put back in what we have just taken out? To get back to a B-
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series, to get from DismalC back to Dismal, we have to add information that 
imposes a direction on DismalC. 
McTaggart tells us three things about what we need to add. First, it is 
related to temporal change, which he takes to be something we experi-
ence — or rather seem to experience, for, according to him, it turns out to 
be an illusion. Second, temporal change is fundamentally diﬀ erent from the 
sort of change we talk about when we say, for example, of a stretch of Hi-
way 4 in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, “For each town from Angel’s Camp 
to Ebbett’s Pass, the elevation above sea-level increases as the distance from 
the Paciﬁ c Ocean increases”. I am inclined to agree with McTaggart about 
both of these things, although I do not think our experience of change is an 
illusion.
Th e third thing McTaggart tells us is that what we need to add to the C-
series, to add direction, is what he calls the A-series, which is the series of 
events ordered by whether they are in the present, past or future, and if one 
of the latter two, how distant. Th e fact that Truman’s inauguration came af-
ter Roosevelt’s 4th inauguration, rather than merely being next to it, and be-
fore Eisenhower’s ﬁ rst, rather than just being next to it, consists in the fact 
that Roosevelt’s fourth inauguration is more distantly past than Truman’s, 
and Truman’s more distantly past than Eisenhower’s. Th is idea of McTag-
gart’s seems to me to have been rather unfortunate, a wrong turn in the phi-
losophy of time. I will return to what is wrong with it later, but for now I 
will try to give what seems to me the correct solution.
I believe that what we need to add to DismalC, in order to return to Dis-
mal, is facts about chronological possibilities, which I will call the “D-P se-
ries”, or, in this case DismalD. Th at is, we need to add propositions about 
what the chronological possibilities were at the time of Roosevelt’s third 
and fourth inaugurations, Truman’s inauguration, and so forth, right down 
through the chronological possibilities at the time of Bush’s ﬁ rst inaugura-
tion, Bush’s second inauguration, Hillary Clinton’s ﬁ rst inauguration, and 
beyond.
I am allowing myself the concept of simultaneity in time, for as I under-
stand McTaggart, this allowed in the C-series. Events X and Y occur at the 
same time if there is no event between them, and we can have this informa-
tion, even if we do not have the information about the direction of events. 
So we can add DismalD to DismalC, giving us a sequence of propositions 
about the occurrence of inaugurations and the chronological possibilities 
and impossibilities at the times those inaugurations occurred.
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During his third term Roosevelt’s vice-president was Henry Wallace, a 
Democrat from the left wing of the party, perhaps correctly called, as he 
was by many Republicans, a socialist. Had Roosevelt chosen Wallace for 
his running mate for the 1944 election, as he certainly could have, then it 
seems that either of two things would have happened. One is that Th omas 
Dewey, the Republican candidate in 1944, would have defeated Roosevelt. 
Th e other is that Roosevelt would have won, and Wallace rather than Tru-
man would have succeeded to the Presidency in 1945 when Roosevelt died. 
If either of these courses of events had occurred, then it is virtually certain 
that Truman would never have been President, for he was a amiable Mis-
souri Senator with no presidential ambitions. So, it seems that at the same 
time as Roosevelt was inaugurated for his third term in 1941, it was chrono-
logically possible that Truman not be inaugurated in 1949, as he in fact was, 
having served out the rest of Roosevelt’s fourth term and having defeated 
Dewey in 1948. However, by the time of Eisenhower’s ﬁ rst inauguration in 
1953, it was no longer chronologically possible that Truman not be inaugu-
rated in 1949.
When we add true propositions about chronological possibilities for oth-
er inaugurations to DismalC, a clear pattern emerges, that gives us two clear 
directions, one of which is the direction of temporal change. As we move 
one direction through augmented DismalC, possibilities will increase, and 
as we move another direction, possibilities will decrease. Th e possibility that 
Gore be inaugurated in 2001 is present at Roosevelt’s second inauguration 
in 1937, and at every subsequent inauguration through Clinton’s second 
inauguration in 1997. Th en it disappears, sad to say. Th e direction of time, 
and of change, is the direction of decreasing possibilities. If we conﬁ ne our-
selves to any ﬁ nite subset of the contingent propositions that be true, more 
and more will be made true, and more and more rendered impossible, as we 
consider events that are later in time, and fewer and fewer will have been 
made true, and fewer and fewer rendered impossible, as we consider events 
that are earlier in time.
5. Change and the D-series
I now turn to the question of whether the D-series meets McTaggart’s 
requirements for what needs to be added to a C-series to get a B-series, 
namely, whether it is something that characterizes our experience of tempo-
ral change, and is not merely a matter of change along a dimension.
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Angels Camp, Murphys, and Arnold are three towns one drives through, 
as one travels east along California hiway 4, which runs from the Bay Area 
through the Sierras to Nevada. Consider the facts about the elevations 
above sea level of these three towns, roughly 1500 feet, 2500 feet, and 3500 
feet. One experiences this change in elevation of towns along hiway 4, rela-
tive to the distance from the Paciﬁ c Ocean, as one travels along the hiway. 
Each of these facts, by itself, does not necessitate the others; Angels Camp 
could be at 1500 feet, even if Murphys were not at 2500 feet, and vice ver-
sa, for example. On the other hand, if we travel along hiway 4 from west 
to east, then by the time we get to Murphy’s we have eliminated the pos-
sibility that Angels Camp has any elevation other than 1500 feet, and that 
Murphy’s has any elevation other than 2500 feet, but not have eliminated 
the possibility that Arnold has some elevation other than 3500 feet. So 
there is a progression, a change, in what is possible, as we travel from east to
west.
Th is is, however, much diﬀ erent from chronological possibility. For one 
thing, the change in what is possible, in this case, has to do with what the 
subject knows; it is a matter of epistemic possibility. Related to this, the 
situation is reversible; if you travel from east to west, then when you get to 
Murphy’s it will not be possible that Arnold has any elevation other than 
3500 feet, but it will be possible that Angels Camp has some elevation other 
than 1500 feet. Chronological possibility is not simply a matter of epistemic 
possibility, and it is not reversible in this way.
Let’s return to our friend Bill Clinton, late September 2008, contemplat-
ing whether to make a speech that will destroy Hillary Clinton’s chances of 
being inaugurated the following January. He might think that it is possible 
for him to destroy her chances; it is something that he can do; it is a pos-
sibility for him; it is up to him. On the other hand, at that point in time, it 
is not possible for him to destroy her chances for being nominated, which 
will have happened in Summer of 2008. Th at was once a possibility, say in 
the early days of the Democratic Convention and before, but it is no longer 
a possibility by early September 2008. In other words, Clinton, is aware of 
chronological possibilities, and chronological impossibilities, as all of us are. 
As we experience change, we experience the decrease in chronological pos-
sibilities, and the increase in chronological impossibilities. Opportunities, 
once missed, are gone. Th e direction in which the chronological impossibili-
ties increase and the chronological possibilities decrease is the direction of 
change as we experience it.
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As we experience change, it involves events occurring, which we perceive 
and participate in, which make it the case that various propositions are true 
or false, and leave no possibility of our doing anything, or anything happen-
ing, that will make them otherwise. Past events and future events play dif-
ferent roles in our lives, cognitive, emotional, and practical, all connected to 
our sense of chronological possibility. We regret the past, and try to make 
up for it, or cover it up, or change its consequences. But we do not try to 
change the past itself. We try to shape the future, to make some events more 
likely to occur, and others less likely to occur. We remember the past; we an-
ticipate the future. Everyone seems to agree about this. People move from 
west to east, and east to west, and as they do they remember where they 
have been, and anticipate the experience of what they have yet to encoun-
ter. But all are anticipating the future, and remembering the past. No one 
moves from future to past, trying to aﬀ ect the past, and remembering the
future.
So, I conclude, chronological change meets McTaggart’s requirements, 
and that by augmenting the DismalC with DismalD we have returned to 
our starting point, Dismal, a B-P series, and done what McTaggart thought 
could not be done. But you won’t be convinced yet, not until we have dis-
cussed the A-series, and some other issues about the B-series.
6. McTaggart and the A-series
McTaggart thought that you had to add the A-series, the one that divides 
events into past, present, and future, to the C-series to get the B-series. He 
did not think that there was a coherent way to do this, and so concluded 
that time was unreal; that is, we have a clear concept of what time would 
have to be, something characterized by the combined C-series and A-series, 
but we see clearly that there can be no such thing.
So according to McTaggart, the fact that Truman’s inauguration came af-
ter Roosevelt’s 4th inauguration, rather than before it, or merely being next 
to it, consists in the fact that Roosevelt’s 4th inauguration is further in the 
past than Truman’s.
I cannot see much merit in McTaggart’s idea. Suppose I say now, truth-
fully if sadly, “George W. Bush’s 2nd inauguration is past”. What fact makes 
that true? A pretty reasonable theory says that my utterance, call it u, is true 
simply because George Bush’s 2nd inauguration precedes u, the utterance 
itself. So, if we want to put the fact that I seem to be getting at when I say 
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“George Bush’s 2nd inaugural is past”, into DismalC, we ought to add the 
proposition to that George Bush’s 2nd inauguration precedes u. But that 
proposition is already a B-P series proposition. If we are going to add B-
series proposition to DismalC in order to get to Dismal, we may as well sim-
ply jump back to Dismal and be done with it.
I should point out that one can agree with this, even if one thinks, as I do, 
that David Kaplan’s theory is correct, in saying the proposition that George 
Bush’s 2nd inauguration precedes u is not the proposition expressed by my 
utterance. According to his theory, the proposition expressed by my utter-
ance of “George Bush’s inauguration is past”, is not a proposition about my 
utterance itself, but (roughly) a proposition about the time t, the time at 
which my utterance occurs, to the eﬀ ect that George Bush’s inauguration 
precedes t. Th is proposition would be true, even if I had not made the utter-
ance u. If we trace Kaplan’s analysis through, we see that my utterance will 
be true iﬀ  George Bush’s election precedes it, for only under those condi-
tions will it express a proposition that is true. Moreover, the expressed prop-
osition, that George Bush’s inauguration precedes t, is also a B-proposition, 
not a C-proposition. 
I don’t mean to imply that McTaggart somehow missed the fact that 
adding these propositions to the C-series would be begging the question. 
He did not think that the words “past”, “present”, and “future” were basi-
cally getting at relations to the utterances of sentences containing them, but 
that they get at properties of events; indeed, he thought that the passage of 
events from future to present, and present to past, was the essence of tem-
poral change. He thought that to ﬁ nd real temporal change, we needed to 
ﬁ nd some temporal way in which the B-series changes, that corresponds to 
our subjective sense of events passing from the future, into the present, and 
then into the past.
But, McTaggart thought, there can be no change in the B-series. Th e 
B-series contains all the events, and their temporal relations, which never 
change — as he puts it,
If M is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier.
So, our concept of time demands that the B-series is the A-series added 
to the C-series; but then the B-series will have to involve events changing 
from future to present to past; but this makes no sense.
So we need to consider whether we have evaded this conundrum. Does 
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my account of what we need to add to the C-series to get a B-series imply 
a sort of change in the B-series that makes no sense? 
7. The future is unreal
As I just said, early in his discussion, McTaggart says,
If M is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier.
It seems to me this is a mistake. Consider Bush’s 2nd inauguration. It has 
happened, while Hillary Clinton’s ﬁ rst inauguration has not happened yet. 
Is it correct to say that Bush’s 2nd inauguration is earlier than Hillary Clin-
ton’s ﬁ rst inauguration? Certainly after Hillary Clinton’s ﬁ rst inauguration 
we can say that Bush’s inauguration was earlier than it. But was it earlier, 
before Hillary’s ﬁ rst inauguration happened? Is it now earlier than her in-
auguration?
It seems to me that Hillary Clinton’s inauguration is not now later than 
Bush’s second inauguration, because Hillary Clinton’s inauguration does 
not yet exist. By Hillary Clinton’s inauguration I mean the concrete event, 
not a description of it, or an abstract object that characterizes it. Th e con-
crete event, it seems to me, has no reality at all until it happens, even if the 
propositions that say that it will happen be true, or for that matter, even if it 
is settled, in the sense I adumbrated in the brief discussion of determinism 
early on, before it happens. Th e concrete event has no existence, no reality, 
until it happens.
My argument for this is that the status of the events that will occur, be-
fore they occur, is the same as the status of the events that might occur in 
their stead, but will not. All are possibilities, not realities, before one of them 
occurs; it becomes real, the others do not.
According to the picture I have put forward, at each time there is a future 
which is characterized by a number of contingent possibilities or proposi-
tions, none of which have been made true at that time, and all of which 
might still be made true, but only one of which will be made factual: a gar-
den of forking paths, as Borges puts it. Th en, at a later time, some of those 
possibilities will be eliminated or made false. Now the simplest explana-
tion, for the legitimacy of this picture, as far as I can see, is that at each time 
all of the possibilities for the future have the same status: they are mere 
possibilities. Th at is, until an event happens (and so makes the proposition
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according to which it happens, true), the event is a merely possible event, 
and not a real event. And by saying it is merely a possible event, I mean to 
say, basically, that it is not an event at all; there are descriptions, and abstract 
types, that will denote or characterize the event once it exists to be denoted 
or characterized. But there is no concrete event.
Consider, for example, the two events, Hillary Clinton’s inauguration in 
2009 and Joseph Biden’s inauguration in 2009. Th ose are both, as I speak, 
possibilities, as these seem to be the two leading contenders for the Demo-
cratic nomination. We assume however that Clinton will be inaugurated, 
and Biden will not be. If so, there is not now, and never will be, a concrete 
event correctly called “Biden’s inauguration in 2009”. Th e lack of such a 
concrete event does not impede us in any way in describing the possibilities 
that there are at the present time, including the possibility that Biden wins 
and is inaugurated.
Now if Biden were to win the nomination, and the election, and be inau-
gurated, we would deﬁ nitely feel the need to recognize a concrete event. Th e 
event in question would be visible, televised, and consequential. It would 
have eﬀ ects, and these only concrete events can have. But we won’t miss the 
concrete event of his inauguration if he does not win. By the same token, we 
will not need the concrete event of Hillary Clinton’s inauguration until she 
wins the nomination and election and is inaugurated. Until then descrip-
tions of it and abstract types that characterize it will serve all of our needs 
in language and thought.
I conclude that future events are not real; they do not exist, until they oc-
cur. Until that time they, the concrete events themselves, are not after the 
other events occur before them. As Broad put it,
Let us take McTaggart’s example of the death of Queen Anne, as an event 
which is supposed to combine the incompatible characteristics of pastness, 
presentness, and futurity. In the ﬁ rst place, we may say at once that, on 
our view, futurity is not and never has been literally a characteristic of the 
event which is characterised as the death of Queen Anne. Before Anne 
died there was no such event as Anne’s death, and “nothing” can have no 
characteristics. After Anne died the sum total of existent reality does con-
tain Anne’s death, but this even then has the characteristic of pastness. 
No doubt I can say “Anne’s death was future to William III”. But I simply 
mean that, so long as William III was alive, there was no event character-
ised as the death of Anne; and that afterwards, as the sum total of exist-
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ence increased by becoming, it contained both the events of William’s life 
and the event of Anne’s death. Anne’s death succeeded William’s life so 
soon as Anne’s death existed at all, and it succeeds it henceforth for ever; 
but it does not succeed it while William was alive, because it had not be-
come, it was not anything, and therefore could not have any characteristics 
or stand in any relations …”.3
And that means, I think, that as I speak, there are no concrete events at 
all that are referred to or denoted by the two descriptions “Hillary Clinton’s 
inauguration in 2009” and “Joseph Biden’s inauguration in 2009”. Th ere are 
two event descriptions, or event types; that is, two linguistic objects and two 
abstract objects. Some day, if things turn out the way I predicted, one of 
these linguistic objects will refer or describe a concrete event, which will be 
of the type in question.
So, as conﬁ dent I am of her victory and inauguration, at the present time, 
still, there is, in the strict and metaphysical sense, no event that ﬁ ts the de-
scription “Hillary Clinton’s 2009 inauguration” any more than there is an 
event that ﬁ ts the description “Joseph Biden’s 2009 inauguration”. Both are 
chronologically possible, which is to say that it hasn’t been ruled as of 2005, 
when I write, that events that will meet these descriptions occur in 2009.
8. Does the B-series change?
But does not this mean that the B-series changes? How can the B-series 
change, if all of the changes are in the B-series?
If the B-series is an actual succession of concrete events, it does change; it 
grows, and we see it do so, when we observe change. If this is what we mean 
by “the B-series” then it is not an abstract set-theoretical object, but an ac-
tual process, the all-inclusive process, of things happening.
If by “the B-series” we a set theorietical sequence of concrete events, then 
it seems to me our idea is incoherent. Right now, in 2005, lots of events that 
will happen have not yet happened. For example, Hillary Clinton’s inaugu-
ration has not yet happened. We can talk about such events using bits of 
language like “Hilary Clinton’s inauguration” or we can model them with 
suitably constructed abstract objects to serve as proxies. We can use these 
3 C. D. Broad, Scientiﬁ c Th ought, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1923, 
pp. 79–80.
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bits of language or abstract objects to build (or imagine building) models 
of various possible candidate B-series, and we can describe one of them as 
the unique one that contains a description of or a proxy for all that ever will 
occur. But the B-series of events itself doesn’t exists until all its constituents 
exist, and they don’t all exist yet.
If by “the B-series” we mean the sequence of descriptions or abstract 
proxies that we can use to model events, or a set-theoretical sequence of 
propositions of the sort we have considered earlier, that will uniquely ﬁ t 
what happens as long as things keep happening, then it is fair to say the 
B-series does not change. But its status may change. At the present time, 
when the results of the 2008 election are still slightly in doubt, there are 
a number of such unchanging abstract objects, sequences of propositions 
say, that are possible B-series: they ﬁ t everything that has happened so far. 
Some of them contain the proposition that in 2009 Hillary Clinton is inau-
gurated, some of them contain the proposition that Joseph Biden is inaugu-
rated, and I suppose still others contain the propositions that Condoleezza 
Rice, or Jeb Bush, or John McCain, or even, given the possibility of a con-
stitutional amendment, Arnold Schwarzenegger, is inaugurated. None of 
these sequences will ever contain diﬀ erent propositions than it does, but 
most of them will change, as time passes, in losing the status of possible
B-series.
In concrete terms, our experience of change, and of the passage of time, 
is the experience new events coming into existence, and old possibilities be-
ing eliminated. In abstract terms, it is seeing propositions being made true 
and false, and sequences containing those propositions ceasing to be pos-
sible B-series.
Conclusion
I have argued that to avoid fatalism we need to recognize a distinction be-
tween propositions that have been made true as of a given time, and propo-
sitions that be true, in the sense that they have been or will be made true. 
Th e “be” in the expression of the second concept is tenseless; it is the way we 
ought to talk about what goes on in “possible worlds”, including our own, 
when we are not describing them from a time within them, or abstracting 
from that time. Th e principle appealed to in the fatalistic argument I con-
sidered is properly couched with the ﬁ rst concept: we cannot now, or at any 
time in the future, make a proposition true that has already been made false, 
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or make a proposition false that has already been made true. But this prin-
ciple does not lead to fatalism.
Given this distinction, it is natural to recognize chronological possibility as 
the sort of possibility that is appealed to in the principle just stated. Chron-
ological possibilities change with time; they are eliminated as one among a 
number of possible events that could have happened, does happen. If we 
characterize the change that is peculiar to time, what is sometimes called 
“temporal becoming”, in terms of this elimination of chronological possi-
bilities, rather than in terms of McTaggart’s “A-series”, then we can, I claim, 
answer the challenge that is at the heart of his argument for the Unreality 
of Time, and explain what must be added to the “C-series” to get to the “B-
series”. Th e A-series, for all the ink that has been spilled discussing it, is a 
bit of a red herring.
Now a couple of ﬁ nal words. First, insofar as I have made any progress 
here it is due to conversations with Th omas Hofweber; we hope someday 
to publish a paper on the important diﬀ erences between events, representa-
tions of them, and models of them which will explain and put in their prop-
er places all of the many insights that have accumulated in discussions of 
McTaggart’s argument. But I have probably not gotten these matters quite 
clear, or quite straight, in this paper.
Second, I was privileged to have Nathan Oaklander as the chair of the 
session at which this paper was presented. Oaklander holds a version of the 
B-theory, the theory I have believed to be correct most of my philosophical 
life, although I have never felt particularly comfortable with it. In conver-
sations in person and by email Oaklander has helped me express my views 
more clearly, and tugged me a bit towards my old view. I am very thankful 
to him for his help, and for his ﬁ ne writings on time.
Although I do believe the view I have developed here to be correct, or at 
least on the right track, as I write, I am very conscious of how diﬃ  cult the 
philosophy of time is. Even my hero Broad, Oaklander tells me, held ﬁ ve 
diﬀ erent theories of time over his career. Th is is my second. I am not all that 
conﬁ dent it will be the last. 
